Leaking Information Through Cache LRU States by Xiong, Wenjie & Szefer, Jakub
Leaking Information Through Cache LRU States
Wenjie Xiong and Jakub Szefer
Yale University New Haven, CT, USA
{wenjie.xiong, jakub.szefer}@yale.edu
Abstract—The widely deployed Least-Recently Used (LRU)
cache replacement policy and its variants are an essential
component of modern processors. However, we show for the first
time in detail that the LRU states of caches can be used to leak
information. The LRU states are shared among all the software
that accesses the cache and we show that timing-based channels
are possible: any access to a cache by a sender will modify the
LRU states, and the receiver is able to observe this through
a timing measurement. This paper presents LRU timing-based
channels both when the sender and the receiver have shared
memory, e.g., shared library data pages, and when they are fully
separate processes without shared memory. In addition, the new
LRU timing-based channels are demonstrated on both Intel and
AMD processors in scenarios where the sender and the receiver
are sharing the cache in both hyper-threaded setting and time-
sliced setting. The transmission rate of the new LRU channel
can be up to 600Kbits/s per cache set in the hyper-threaded
setting. Different from the existing cache channels which require
the sender to have cache misses, the new LRU channels work
with cache hits, making the channel faster and more stealthy
as no cache misses are required for the sender. This paper
also demonstrates that the new LRU channels can be used in
transient execution attacks, e.g., Spectre, to retrieve the victim’s
secret. Further, this paper presents evaluation showing that the
LRU channels also pose threats to existing secure cache designs.
Possible defenses against the LRU timing-based channels are
discussed and evaluated in simulation, with defense features
added to protect the LRU states.
Index Terms—caches, side channels, covert channels, timing-
based channels, replacement policy, LRU
I. INTRODUCTION
Side channels and covert channels in processors have been
gaining renewed attention in recent years. Many of these
side channels leverage the timing information, and especially
the differences between the timing of certain operations that
are affected by the processor state. To date, researchers have
shown numerous timing-based channels in caches, e.g., [1]–
[6], as well as other parts of the processor, such as the
shared functional units in SMT processors, e.g., [7]–[13]. The
canonical example of timing channels are the channels in
processor caches, where timing reveals information about the
state of the processor cache. This in turn can be used to leak
information such as cryptographic keys [3], [14]–[17]. Many
of the variants of the recent Spectre and Meltdown attacks
also use covert channels in addition to transient execution to
exfiltrate data [18]–[20].
All existing cache attacks in peer-reviewed literature require
a cache miss by a sender to replace some data in the cache,
the miss (or lack there of) causes a timing difference when
a latter access is made by a receiver. Meanwhile, this paper
presents a new cache timing-based channels in processors,
which are based on sender making cache accesses (no matter
hits or misses).
In processors, the order in which the cache lines are evicted
depends on the cache’s replacement policy and the state.
Normally, different variants of the Least-Recently Used (LRU)
policy are implemented in modern processors, such as Tree-
PLRU [21] or Bit-PLRU [22]. LRU state is maintained for
each cache set, and it is used to determine which cache line
in a cache set should be replaced when there is a cache miss
causing a cache replacement. The LRU state is updated on
every cache accesses to indicate which cache line in the set
was just accessed. Thus, both cache hits and misses in the set
cause updates to the LRU state of the set.
One important feature of the new LRU timing-based chan-
nels is that the sender process does not have to trigger cache
replacement (e.g., no data needs to be evicted from the cache)
compared to all other cache timing-based side channels. LRU
channel works even when the sender only triggers a cache
hit, and the receiver later triggers a possible replacement to
measure the time. This feature benefits the transient execution
attacks, as only a small speculation window is required for
the attacker.
The new LRU timing-based channels are also a threat
to many of the existing secure caches proposals. Numerous
secure caches [23]–[33] have been presented, and they aim
to either partition or randomize the victim’s and the attacker’s
cache accesses to defend the cache timing-based side channels.
However, most of the secure caches have not considered
the LRU states and are vulnerable to the new LRU attack.
This paper demonstrates the problems with LRU states, and
fixes them, for the case of the well-known Partition-Locked
(PL) cache [24].
In this paper, the new LRU timing-based channels are
demonstrated and evaluated in-depth for the first time. The
biggest challenge of the LRU channels is how the receiver
can accurately observe which level of cache a memory access
hits in – i.e., how to measure the timing precisely. This paper
proposes to use dedicated data structures and a pointer chasing
algorithm in the receiver’s program to allow for fine-grained
measurements of the latency of memory accesses. Further,
two algorithms are designed to build LRU timing channels
both with and without shared memory between the sender
and the receiver, making the LRU channels practical in a
variety of attack scenarios. We evaluated the LRU channel
on a number of commercial processors including Intel and
AMD processors with different micro-architectures, and both
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hyper-threaded and time-sliced sharing settings are considered.
The LRU channels are also demonstrated to be usable in a
Spectre attack.
To mitigate the new LRU timing-based channels, a number
of defenses are discussed and evaluated. Further, as an exam-
ple, secure PL cache design [24] is evaluated with the LRU
channel and shown to have vulnerability with the LRU states.
The design is then improved to defend the LRU attacks and
evaluated in simulation.
A. Contributions
The contributions of this work are as follows:
• The first detailed presentation of how the LRU states in
caches can be used as a timing-based side and covert
channels for information leaks, both with and without
shared memory between the sender and the receiver.
• Detailed analysis and evaluation of a practical way to
transfer information via the LRU channels. Evaluation
of the transmission rates and bit error rates of the LRU
covert channels on both Intel and AMD processors.
Comparison of the LRU channels with the existing cache
channels from the perspective of encoding time and cache
miss rates.
• Demonstration of how the LRU channels can be used in
transient execution attacks.
• Proposal for and evaluation of mitigations of the LRU
channels, which can be applied to micro-architecture
designs.
• Demonstration of how the LRU channels break the secu-
rity of PL cache [24], and how it can be fixed.
II. BACKGROUND
CPU caches leverage the temporal and spatial locality
of memory accesses in programs to reduce memory access
latency. Data blocks are stored in caches as the cache lines.
If data in a cache line is requested, it will be served faster.
Set-associative cache is the most common cache structure as a
result of design trade-off between performance and hardware
complexity. In set-associative caches, a cache line can only
be in the cache set its address maps to, and later only that
cache set needs to be looked up for the cache line. An N -way
set-associative cache has N entries in each cache set.
A. Existing Timing-Based Cache Side and Covert Channels
Caches have been leveraged to build timing-based side
and covert channels in processors. The cache side channels
have been shown to enable attackers to steal secret keys
across different security domains and across processor cores,
e.g., [1]–[4]. The recent Spectre, Meltdown, and their variants
can use cache covert channels in transient execution [18]–[20],
which poses a further risk to modern computers. Whether a
cache line is in cache or not affects the timing of the cache
operations, and different programs or threads can affect each
other by accessing data in the same cache. Two examples of
attacks are listed below:
Flush+Reload attack [1]: A cache line is first flushed out
of the cache. Next, the sender accesses the cache line, or not,
depending on the message to be sent, i.e., the sender has a
cache miss to trigger a replacement (if accessed) or not (if not
accessed). In the last step, the receiver accesses (i.e., reloads)
the same cache line, and measures the time of the access. If the
last access is a cache hit (small access latency), the receiver
can infer that the sender accessed the line.
Prime+Probe attack [2]: First, the receiver occupies a
whole cache set by accessing N different cache lines mapping
to a set. Next, the sender accesses a cache line in the set, or
not, depending on the message to be sent, i.e., the sender again
has a cache miss to trigger a replacement (if accessed) or not
(if not accessed). In the last step, the receiver probes all the
N cache lines used in the first step, and measures the time
of the N accesses. If the one of the accesses is a cache miss
(large access latency), the receiver can infer that the sender
accessed the cache set in the second step.
Many other attacks exist as well. They all, however, have the
distinction of requiring a cache miss (or no access) to occur
when the sender is sending information. Meanwhile, any cache
access, both cache hit or miss, can trigger the new LRU attack.
B. Cache Replacement Policy
When a cache line is accessed but it is not in the cache
(i.e., a cache miss), the cache line will be fetched into the
cache set. In this case, another cache line needs to be evicted
from the cache set to make room for the incoming cache line.
The replacement policy selects a cache way from the set to
evict, known as the victim way. The replacement algorithm
uses some state to store the history of accesses to cache
ways in a given set. There are a number of replacement
algorithms, such as random replacement policy, First-In First-
Out (FIFO) replacement policy, and LRU replacement policy.
Among them, in L1 cache, the LRU policy and its variants
are most widely used because they give high cache hit rate. In
last level cache (LLC), due to the reduced data locality, other
replacement policies are proposed [34].
LRU: The LRU algorithm keeps track of the age of cache
lines, using log(N) bits per cache line per way in an N -way
cache to store the age of the line. If a cache replacement is
needed on a cache miss, the least recently used cache way
(i.e., oldest way) will be selected to be the victim way and
it will be evicted. The “true” LRU algorithm is expensive in
terms of latency (to update LRU states) and area (to store the
age of all the cache lines). This makes it prohibitive when the
cache associativity is greater than 4, so often a variant of a
Pseudo Least-Recently Used (PLRU) is used instead.
Tree-PLRU: The Tree-PLRU [21] uses a binary tree struc-
ture to keep track of the cache access history in a cache set.
For an N -way set-associative cache, the tree has N −1 nodes
with each taking 1 bit, for a total of N −1 bits for each cache
set to store the access history of all the cache ways. Each
tree node indicates whether the left sub-tree or the right sub-
tree has been less recently used. To find the victim way, the
replacement algorithm starts from the root and always goes to
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Fig. 1: Cache organization and the steps of the LRU timing-based
side or covert channel.
the less recently used child to find the leaf node that indicates
the victim way. To update the Tree-PLRU when a cache line
in a way is accessed, all the nodes on the path from the root
to the accessed way’s leaf node are set to point to the child
that is not the ancestor of the accessed cache way.
Bit-PLRU: The Bit-PLRU [22], which is also called Most
Recently Used (MRU), uses one bit to store the history of each
cache way, called MRU-bit. For an N -way cache set, a total
of N bits are required. When a way is accessed, its MRU-bit
will be set to 1, indicating the way is recently used. Once all
the ways have the MRU-bit set to 1, all the MRU-bits are reset
to 0. To find a victim, the way with the lowest index whose
MRU-bit is 0 is chosen. The logic of the Bit-PLRU is simpler
than Tree-PLRU.
III. THREAT MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
We assume set-associative caches and further assume the
cache uses an LRU or PLRU replacement algorithm which
evicts the least recently used cache line. Like all other side
or covert channels, the LRU timing-based channel involves
two parties: the sender and the receiver. Following techniques
used in [35], [36], we assume the two process can be co-
located on the same core to share the L1 cache, as shown
in Figure 1, either in an SMT machine as two hyper-threads
running in parallel or as two threads time-sharing the core.
Existing attacks show that sharing the same physical core is
practical and poses real threats to computer systems, such as
due to side channels [9]–[13] or Spectre attacks leveraging
BTB or RSB [18], [37], [38]. The LRU states of the shared
cache can be influenced (by the sender) and observed (by the
receiver).
In this paper, we focus on the LRU states in L1 cache. The
LRU channels in the other levels of caches are also possible1.
Depending on the cache architecture, for the sender to update
the LRU states of the lower level of caches, a miss in the
higher cache level is required, e.g., the sender’s accesses to L1
or L2 caches will not change the replacement state in the LLC.
Especially, L1 is directly accessed by the processor pipeline
1Concurrently to this submission, a preprint paper [39] has been recently
posed on arXiv on side channels that leverage the replacement policy in LLC.
This work is compared to the preprint in Section X.
and L1 LRU state is updated on every memory access. Thus,
we focus on the L1 Data (L1D) cache.
If the sender is benign, but the processes happens to modify
the LRU states based on some secret information, then this
is an LRU side channel, and the sender is typically called
the victim. If the sender is malicious, e.g., a small piece of
malicious software trojan in a protected domain is used to
pass the secret information out of the domain, then this is an
LRU covert channel. In both cases, we assume the receiver can
extract useful information from the memory access pattern of
the sender, from the LRU states.
IV. LRU TIMING-BASED CHANNELS
The LRU timing-based channels leverage the LRU states of
cache sets. In this section, we discuss how the LRU state in
one cache set can be used to transfer information, which is
referred to as the target set. In practice, several sets can be
used in parallel to increase the transmission rate or to reduce
the noise.
As introduced in Section II-B, the LRU state for each set
contains several bits, thus it is possible to transfer more than 1
bit per target set. However, limited by the fact that any access
to the set will change the LRU state, we focus on letting the
receiver only measure the set once. Especially, the receiver
can observe the timing of one memory access which can only
have two results: a cache hit or a cache miss. Thus, at most
one bit can be transferred per cache set at one time. To transfer
information using an LRU channel, in general, there are three
phases:
Initialization Phase: First, a sequence of memory accesses
is performed so that the LRU state is partially known to the
receiver. In a covert channel, this step can be done by either
the sender, receiver, or jointly. In a side channel, this step has
to be done by the sender.
Encoding Phase: To send information, the sender accesses
one or more memory locations mapping to the target set
to change the LRU state. The pattern of memory accesses
depends on the information to be sent. For example, in the
protocols in Section IV-A and IV-B, the sender conducts one
memory access depending on the 1-bit message to be sent.
Decoding Phase: The receiver first accesses one or more
memory locations mapping to the target set to potentially
trigger a cache replacement and cause a cache line to be
evicted based on the LRU state. The attacker then observes
the timing of accessing the memory location to learn if the
cache line is evicted and thus infer the LRU state.
A. LRU Channel with Shared Memory
As shown in Algorithm 1, this is the first communication
protocol which uses the LRU cache states in N -way set-
associative cache, and which assumes shared memory. Later,
in Section IV-B, a protocol which does not require shared
memory is presented. Both are designed to be light-weight in
the encoding phase, where the sender only needs to do at most
one memory access.
Algorithm 1: LRU Channel with Shared Memory
line 0-N : N+1 different cache lines mapping to the target set
m: a 1-bit message to transfer on the channel
d: a parameter of the receiver
Receiver Operations:
// Step 0: Initialization Phase
for i = 0; i < d; i = i+ 1 do
Access line i;
end
sleep; // To allow the sender code to run here for encoding
// Step 2: Decoding Phase
for i = d; i < N + 1; i = i+ 1 do
Access line i;
end
Access line 0 and time the access;
Sender Operations:
// Step 1: Encoding Phase
if m=1 then
Access line 0;
else
Do not access line 0;
end
The sender and the receiver first agree on the target cache
set they will use to transfer information. We use the term
line 0-N to denote N+1 different cache lines that map to
the target set. This can be achieved by using data in N+1
different physical addresses with the same cache index bits
but different tag bits. Note that line x (x ∈ [0, N ]) here refers
to a cache line at a certain physical address not a specific
cache entry. Line x could be placed in any cache way in the
set. Line 0-N can be at any accessible addresses satisfying
the above, the name does not imply certain literal physical
address x. In Algorithm 1, the sender and the receiver both
need to use the same physical address (or a physical address
within the 64-byte cache line boundary) to access cache line 0
in the cache. This can be achieved by a memory location in a
shared dynamic linked library, as in [1]. m is a 1-bit message
to be sent. d is a parameter of the protocol that is chosen by
the receiver.
In the initialization phase, the receiver first accesses d cache
lines, in order to set the initial LRU state of the target set.
Then, in the encoding phase, the sender either accesses line 0
or does not access it depending on the message to be sent (in
this paper, access means to transfer bit m=1, no access means
to transfer bit m=0). In the decoding phase, the receiver first
accesses the other N+1−d lines. In total, the receiver accesses
N+1 cache lines in the set. Thus, if the sender did not access
line 0 in the encoding phase, line 0 will be evicted2, otherwise
it will not, because its LRU position of the line will be set to
newest during the encoding phase. To check this, the receiver
can measure the time of accessing line 0 to test if line 0 is
still in the cache or not (due to the sender’s access).
2With PLRU replacement algorithms, line 0 is not guaranteed to be evicted
with this access sequence. However, as will be evaluated in Section IV-C, line
0 will be evicted in most of the cases.
Algorithm 2: LRU Channel without Shared Memory
line 0-N : N+1 different cache lines mapping to the target set
m: a 1-bit message to transfer on the channel
d: a parameter of the receiver
Receiver Operations:
// Step 0: Initialization Phase
for i = 0; i < d; i = i+ 1 do
Access line i;
end
sleep; // To allow the sender code to run here for encoding
// Step 2: Decoding Phase
for i = d; i < N ; i = i+ 1 do
Access line i;
end
Access line 0 and time the access;
Sender Operations:
// Step 1: Encoding Phase
if m=1 then
Access line N ;
else
Do not access target set;
end
For example, when N=8 and d=8, the sequence of memory
accesses when sending m=0 is as follows:
• Init. Phase: 0→ 1→ 2→ 3→ 4→ 5→ 6→ 7
• Encoding Phase: no access
• Decoding Phase: 8→ 0 (miss)
In this 8-way set associative cache, line 0 will be chosen by
the LRU policy as the victim way and will be evicted from
L1 when accessing line 8, and the receiver will observe L1
miss when accessing line 0 in the end.
Meanwhile, the sequence of memory accesses when sending
m=1 is as follows:
• Init. Phase: 0→ 1→ 2→ 3→ 4→ 5→ 6→ 7
• Encoding Phase: 0 (hit)
• Decoding Phase: 8→ 0 (hit)
Here, line 0 will be in the cache all the time, especially during
encoding phase, the access to line 0 will make it become the
newest line in the LRU state, and the remaining accesses in the
decoding phase will not evict it. When the receiver measures
the time of accessing line 0 in the decoding phase, the receiver
will observe an L1 cache hit, and the receiver can infer that
the sender has m=1.
B. LRU Channel without Shared Memory
Shared memory required in Algorithm 1 between the sender
and the receiver is not always possible. In Algorithm 2, the
sender and the receiver do not need to access any shared
memory location. The sender only accesses line N , while the
receiver accesses line 0–(N−1) in the target set.
Once the target set is decided, the sender and the receiver
can map memory accesses to the target set by using proper
virtual memory addresses in their own memory spaces. For
performance, L1 cache is usually virtual-indexed and physical-
tagged (VIPT). For example, for an L1 cache with 64 sets with
a cache line size of 64 bytes, bits 6–11 of the address decide
the cache set. Since the lower 12 bits in the virtual address and
physical address are the same, the receiver can make sure lines
0–(N−1) map to the same set as line N by using memory
locations with bits 6-11 of the virtual address to be the same
as line N .
In Algorithm 2, in the initialization phase, the receiver first
accesses d cache lines, in order to set the initial LRU state
of the target set. Then in the encoding phase, the sender
accesses line N or does not, depending on the message to be
sent (again access means m=1 and no access means m=0).
In the decoding phase, the receiver accesses the other N−d
lines. Thus, when combining the initialization phase and the
decoding phase, the receiver accesses N cache lines in total,
just fitting in the cache set which has N ways. If the sender
accesses line N in the encoding phase, line 0 will be chosen
as the victim by the LRU policy in the decoding phase, and
will be replaced by the cache line accessed by the receiver.
Thus, if the receiver observes longer timing for accessing line
0, he or she knows that the sender sent m=1.
For example, when N=8 and d=4, the order of memory
accesses when sending m=0 is as follows:
• Init. Phase: 0→ 1→ 2→ 3
• Encoding Phase: no access
• Decoding Phase: 4→ 5→ 6→ 7→ 0 (hit)
And the order of memory accesses when sending m=1 is:
• Init. Phase: 0→ 1→ 2→ 3
• Encoding Phase: 8 (hit, if line 8 is in cache before Init.
Phase)
• Decoding Phase: 4→ 5→ 6→ 7→ 0 (miss)
Whether the sender accesses line 8 or not will change the
LRU state, and in the decoding phase it will decide which
line will be evicted if the sender’s access to line 7 misses
in the cache. The receiver will observe an L1 cache hit when
accessing line 0 if the sender is sending m=0, and will observe
an L1 cache miss if the sender is sending m=0. Compared to
Algorithm 1, there will be more noise on this channel, as any
thread accessing the target set can cause line 0 to be evicted.
A miss of line 0 does not necessarily mean that the sender
accessed line 8. The noise is due to no shared memory, and
other known cache side channel attacks (e.g., Prime+Probe
channel [2]) also have this source of noise.
C. PLRU vs. LRU Replacement Policy
In true LRU, the least recently used way is always chosen as
the victim. For example, consider the following two memory
accesses sequences in an 8-way cache, with each number
representing accessing a line mapping to the set:
• Sequence 1 (access in order): 0 → 1 → 2 → 3 → 4 →
5→ 6→ 7→ 8.
• Sequence 2 (access in order with random insertion): 0
(→ x) → 1 (→ x) → 2 (→ x) → 3 (→ x) → 4
(→ x) → 5 (→ x) → 6 (→ x) → 7. Here, line x is
a cache line that maps to this cache set and is different
from lines 0–7. The parentheses indicate the access might
happen or not, and we assume line x will be accessed at
least once.
If true LRU is used, line 0 will be evicted in both sequences.
However, in PLRU, line 0 is not guaranteed to be evicted.
Because PLRU uses less state bits to track the memory
access history, the cache LRU state before the access sequence
could still affect the choice of victim way, and longer history
should be considered when analyzing the PLRU. Consider
the following initial conditions before accessing the above
sequence:
• Random: The cache contains some of the lines 0–7 and
probably other lines, and the initial accessing order of
lines 0–7 is random.
• Sequential: The cache contains some of the lines 0–7 and
probably other lines, and the initial accessing of lines 0–7
is in sequential order (e.g., previous access to the set is
accessed in order with random insertion like Sequence 2).
We implemented an in-house simulator to simulate the
Tree-PLRU [21] and Bit-PLRU [22] replace policies in an
8-way set. First, in the warm-up phases, we create accesses
to the set for each of the possible initial conditions. For the
random initial condition, random access sequences are used.
For the sequential initial condition, Sequence 2 is used, with
the probability of x being accessed in each parentheses being
50%. Then, Sequence 1 or Sequence 2 is accessed in a loop,
and whether line 0 is in the cache after each sequence is
recorded for each loop iteration. We repeat the above test in
the simulator for 10, 000 times for each configuration, and
present results in Table I.
As shown in Table I, under random initial condition, line 0
might still be kept in the cache with a high probability. Mean-
while, sequential initial condition gives a high probability of
line 0 being evicted after several loop iterations, especially for
sequence 1 and the Bit-PLRU. Note that true LRU will always
evict line 0.
In the above study, Sequence 1 is the access pattern of using
Algorithm 1 sending m=0. Sequence 2 is the access pattern
of using Algorithm 2 sending m=1 in hyper-threaded sharing,
where x is line 8. In hyper-threaded sharing, the memory
accesses by different processes interleave in a random order.
Loop iteration is the case when the receiver is measuring in
a loop, while the sender is sending bits repeatedly. Random
initial condition happens when some process is using line 1–7
TABLE I: Probability of line 0 being evicted with PLRU
Init.
Cond.
Num.
Loop
Iter.
LRU Tree-PLRU Bit-PLRU
Seq.
1&2
Seq.
1
Seq.
2
Seq.
1
Seq.
2
R
an
do
m 1 100% 50.4% 62.7% 38.5% 55.5%
2 100% 82.8% 65.6% 55.6% 69.7%
3 100% 99.2% 64.2% 67.3% 80.1%
>= 8 100% 100% ∼62% 100% ∼99%
Se
qu
en
tia
l 1 100% 90.9% 75.6% 60.4% 61.0%
2 100% 100% 65.9% 63.0% 64.1%
3 100% 100% 64.0% 67.3% 70.3%
>= 8 100% 100% ∼62% 100% ∼99%
in a random order. Sequential initial condition happens when
line 1–7 are always accessed in order. In the two proposed
LRU channels, if line 0 is still in the cache when it should be
evicted according to true LRU, it will result in errors in the
channel. The simulation results show that the sequential initial
condition gives higher eviction rate. Thus, the receiver should
ensure the sequential initial condition by placing line 1–7 in
the receiver’s address space and then always accessing them
in order.
D. Challenge: Measuring the Latency of L1 Hit and Miss
The major challenge for the receiver is to measure the
memory access time precisely and to distinguish an L1 cache
hit and an L1 cache miss (an L2 cache hit or longer). Table II
shows the access latency of L1 hit and L1 miss on the
microarchitectures we tested. L1 hit takes less than 5 CPU
cycles, and L2 hit takes about 10-20 CPU cycles. Due to the
noise caused by the serializing and the granularity of time
stamp counter, using rdtscp instruction (or lfence and rdtsc
instructions) to measure the latency of a memory access cannot
distinguish L1 hit from L2 hit. The measurement results of L1
hit and L2 hit are the same (shown in Appendix A).
Thus, we propose to use pointer chasing algorithm and
a dedicated data structure to measure one memory access
precisely. In the pointer chasing algorithm in Figure 2, a
linked list, where each element stores the address of the next
elements, is required. In the code listed, the rbx points to the
head of the linked list. Since the address of the mov instruction
depends on the data fetched from the previous mov instruction,
all the eight accesses are serialized. However, in a side and
covert channel scenario, it is not practical to use Algorithm 1
to build a linked list containing the sender’s memory access
destination in a read-only shared library.
Instead of a linked list in the shared library, we use a linked
list of 7 elements3 in the receiver’s own memory space, and let
the 7th element contain the memory address to be measured.
In this way, when measuring latency with the pointer chasing
algorithm in Figure 2, it will first access 7 local elements and
3The size of the linked list does not have to be 7. However, if the size is
small, the noise by lfence will affect the measurements. If the size is large,
there will be noise in accessing the elements in the linked list. 7 elements
work in our experiments well.
TABLE II: Latency of cache
access (cycles)
Microarchitecture L1D L2
Intel Sandy Bridge 4-5 12
Intel Skylake 4-5 12
AMD Zen 4-5 17
r d t s c p
movl %eax , %e s i
movq (% rbx ) , %r a x
movq (% r a x ) , %r a x
movq (% r a x ) , %r a x
movq (% r a x ) , %r a x
movq (% r a x ) , %r a x
movq (% r a x ) , %r a x
movq (% r a x ) , %r a x
movq (% r a x ) , %r a x
r d t s c p
s u b l %e s i , %eax
Fig. 2: Pointer
chasing algorithm.
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Fig. 3: Histogram of access latencies of seven L1 hits and the 8th
element being L1 hit or miss when measuring one target address with
pointer chasing (left) on Intel Xeon E5-2690 and (right) on AMD
EPYC 7571.
Algorithm 3: Covert Channel Protocol
m: k-bit message to be sent on the channel
Ts: sender’s sending period
Tr: receiver’s sampling time
TSC: current time stamp counter, obtained by rdtsc
Sender Code:
for i = 0; i < k; i = i+ 1 do
for an amount time Ts do
Step 1: Encoding Phase, encoding m[k]
end
end
Receiver Code:
while True do
Step 0: Initializion Phase
while TSC < Tlast + Tr do
nothing;
end
Tlast =TSC
Step 2: Decoding Phase
end
the target address at the end and measure the total time of the
8 serial memory accesses. Before running the measurement,
the receiver can fetch the first 7 local elements to L1 cache,
so the first 7 accesses will always hit in L1 and the total time
depends on whether the 8th element is in L1 cache or not.
Figure 3 shows the result of this measurement strategy (L1
hit of the first 7 elements and the 8th element being L1 hit or
miss). The difference between an L1 hit and an L1 miss of the
8th element is distinguishable on Intel processors. On AMD
processor, the latency of L1 hit and L1 miss show different
distributions. To avoid the first 7 elements polluting the LRU
state of the target set, one further optimization is to put the
7 elements in one cache set and any other set can be used as
the target set.
V. LRU COVERT CHANNELS IN INTEL PROCESSORS
To evaluate the transmission rate of the LRU channel, we
evaluate it as a covert channel using one target set in the L1D
cache. As shown in Algorithm 3, the sender sends each bit
of message m for Ts CPU cycles, by running the sender’s
operations (in Algorithm 1 or 2) for Ts in a loop for each
bit in the message that the sender wants to send. Ts decides
the transmission rate. We calculate the transmission rate with
the total number of bits sent divided by the time (measured by
time in Linux). The receiver runs the receiver’s operations (in
Algorithm 1 or 2) every Tr CPU cycles in a loop and measures
the latency using pointer chasing discussed in Section IV-D.
In this section, the evaluation is conducted on Intel Xeon
E5-2690 and Intel Xeon E3-1245 v5. The specifications of
the tested CPU models are listed in Table III. We evaluated
both LRU Channel with shared memory and without shared
memory presented in Section IV under both hyper-threaded
sharing and time-sliced sharing settings.
A. LRU Channels in Hyper-Threaded Sharing
For the hyper-threading case, we tested the covert channel
when the sender and the receiver are sharing the same physical
core as two hyper-threads. Each of the sender and the receiver
is a process (i.e., a separate program) in Linux.
LRU Channel with Shared Memory: In Algorithm 1,
shared memory is needed among the sender and the receiver
processes, e.g., achieved by a shared library. Figure 5 (top)
shows the traces observed by the receiver when the sender is
sending 0 and 1 alternatively on both processors tested with
Tr = 600, Ts = 6000, and d = 8. When the sender is sending
bit 1, the access time of line 0 by the receiver is smaller, as
is discussed in Section IV-A. Due to the space limit, only the
results on Intel Xeon E5-2690 is shown in Figure 5 (and the
results on E3-1245 v5 are in Appendix B). The two processors
shows similar results, except that the two processors have
different thresholds of L1 hit and miss latency. This is due
to different latencies for L1 or L2 cache access on the two.
Also, the two processors are running at different frequencies,
and thus, even with the same Ts = 6000, the transmission rate
is 480Kbps for E5-2690 and 580Kbps for E3-1245 v5.
To evaluate the error rate of the channel, we evaluate the
case where the sender process sends a random 128-bit binary
string repeatedly. There are 3 types of errors in the channel: 1)
bit flips, 2) bit insertions, or 3) bit loss. To evaluate the error
rate of the channel, the edit distance between the sent string
and the received string is calculated using the Wagner-Fischer
algorithm [40]. For each test, the 128-bit string is sent at least
30 times, and the average errors of the trials is calculated.
The receiver’s operations of Algorithm 1 in total takes about
560 cycles on both CPUs tested without sleep, including log-
TABLE III: Specifications of the tested CPU models
Model Intel Xeon
E5-2690
Intel Xeon
E3-1245 v5
AMD
EPYC 7571
Microarchitecture Sandy
Bridge
Skylake Zen
Number of cores 8 4 N/Aa
L1D size of each
core
32KB 32KB 32KB
L1D associativity 8-way 8-way 8-way
L1D number of sets 64 64 64
Frequency 3.8GHz 3.9GHz 2.5GHz
OS 16.04.1 Ubuntu
aWe use the AMD processor on Amazon AWS EC2 platform. The CPU model
is specific for Amazon AWS. One core was leased for our experiments.
ging of the results. As shown in Algorithm 3, the receiver will
sleep, until Tr cycles have been reached, thus, Tr>560. Thus,
we evaluate Tr = {600, 1000, 3000} cycles. In the sender
process, sending period Ts = {4500, 6000, 12000, 30000} are
tested. We test parameter d = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}, since
the processors have 8-way set-associative caches and the
maximum possible d is 8.
Figure 4 (top) shows the error rate of the channel versus
the different transmission rates (i.e., different values of Ts).
As shown in the figure, d does not affect the error rate much
on the E5-2690. This is because in hyper-threaded sharing, the
sender process and the receiver process execute in parallel. The
sender operation can happen when the receiver is executing
any part of his or her operation, and d only makes the sender
operation more likely to happen in the sleep part of the
receiver’s operation. Tr = 1000 gives slightly better error
rate than Tr = 600, this might be because more interleaving
between the two threads due to larger Tr and the receiver can
observe more sender’s activity in one measurement. As Tr
increases to 3000 cycles, the error rate increases. In general,
the error rate increases as the transmission rate increases (i.e.,
Ts decreases). This is because a greater Ts or a smaller Tr will
result in more measurements for each of the bit transmitted,
and the noise can be cancelled out by taking the average of
the measurement results.
LRU Channel without Shared Memory: In Algorithm
2, shared memory is not required among the sender and
the receiver processes. Figure 5 (bottom) shows the traces
observed by the receiver, when Tr = 600, Ts = 6000 and
d = 4. When the sender is sending bit 1, the access time of
line 0 by the receiver is larger, due to sender’s access to the
same set, as is discussed in Section IV-B.
For Algorithm 2, we also evaluate Tr = {600, 1000, 3000}
cycles, Ts = {4500, 6000, 12000, 30000} cycles and d =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8} on both CPU models. Figure 4 (bottom)
shows the error rate versus the different transmission rates (dif-
ferent values of Ts) on E5-2690. Compared to LRU channel
with shared memory, LRU channel without shared memory has
more noise. As indicated in the simulation result of accessing
sequence 2 in Section IV-C, in Tree-PLRU, when the sender
access the set, the receiver may not observe a miss in the end,
resulting in a false 0. Also, any access to the same set (by
the other part of the program or other processes on the core)
may result in a false 1. However, these errors usually occur
consecutively in time. So the receiver can detect the noise if
observing a long sequence of all 1 or all 0. We exclude those
traces to obtain Figure 4.
When d = {2, 4, 6}, the error rate is large on E5-2690,
especially when Tr is large. This may due to that even d makes
the Tree-PLRU state point to another side of the subtree, and
the receiver will not evict line 0 in the decoding phase. The
trend of the error rate is similar to that of the LRU channel
with shared memory.
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Fig. 4: Transmission error rate (evaluated by edit distance) as a function of the transmission rate (different Ts) for different Tr on Intel
Xeon E5-2690 using (top) Algorithm 1 and (bottom) Algorithm 2.
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Fig. 5: Example sequences of receiver’s observation when the sender
is sending 0 and 1 alternatively on Intel Xeon E5-2690 with a
transmission rate of 480Kbps using (top) Algorithm 1 with Tr=600,
Ts=6000, and d=8 and (bottom) Algorithm 2 with Tr=600,
Ts=6000 and d=4. The blue dots show the latencies observed by the
receiver, and the red dot line shows the threshold of the L1 cache hit.
B. LRU Channels in Time-Sliced Sharing
When the sender and receiver are sharing the same core in
a time-sliced sharing setting, the two processes still share the
same L1 cache. To evaluate the covert channel in a time-sliced
sharing setting, we programmed the sender process to always
send 1 or 0, and the receiver to measure the time of accessing
line 0 every Tr.
Figure 6 shows the percentage of 1’s received for different
d and Tr when the sender is sending 0 or 1 using Algorithm
1 on both CPUs tested. Each data point comes from 1000
measurements.
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Fig. 6: Percentage of 1’s observed by the receiver on Intel Xeon
E5-2690, when the sender is sending (left) 0 and (right) 1 using
Algorithm 1 under time-sliced sharing.
As is shown in Figure 6, with proper parameters, the
receiver can distinguish between sender sending 0 and 1. For
example, if d = 8 and Tr = 108 cycles, the receiver will
observe almost 100% of bit 0 when the sender is sending 0,
and the receiver will observe about 30% of bit 1 when the
sender is sending 1 on both Intel processors. The receiver
does not observe 1 with a higher probability, because in
time-sliced sharing, each process uses the core for a certain
period of time. When the receiver monitors the sender in
a loop, multiple loop iterations will run within a time-slice
period, and only the first iteration will reflect the sender’s
behavior, the other iterations in the time period run without
interleaving with the sender. Nevertheless, the receiver can still
recognize the message the sender is sending by the percentage
of 1’s received. Assuming 10 measurements are needed when
Tr = 10
8 to differentiate 30% from <5%, the transmission
rate is about 2.4 bits per second.
Compared to hyper-threaded sharing, much larger Tr is
needed here to have interaction between the two threads (about
108 cycles for both processors tested). However, if Tr is too
large, the distinguishability decreases, as other processes might
be scheduled during Tr. As is shown in Figure 6, d = 8 and
d = 7 gives the best distinguishability between the sender
sending 0 and 1. This is because when Tr is large, the time
for the receiver’s operations becomes small compared to the
sleep time. Thus, the context switch is more likely to happen
during the sleep time. In Algorithm 1, a bigger d will have
less access to the target set after the sleep, and line 0 is less
likely to be evicted in the decoding phase.
We also tried to demonstrate Algorithm 2 but failed to
observe any signal from the measurement. We think the reason
is that the Tr should be large to allow interference between
the sender and the receiver, however, any other processes
running during Tr could pollute the target set and introduce
much noise.
VI. LRU COVERT CHANNELS IN AMD PROCESSORS
In this section, we evaluate the characteristics of the LRU
covert channel on AMD EPYC 7571 processor on Amazon
AWS EC2 platform. The specification of the tested processor
is listed in Table III. The methodology of the evaluation is
similar to that on Intel processors in Section V.
A. Measuring Access Latency on AMD Processors
As shown in Section IV-D Figure 3, the latency mea-
sured by rdtscp instruction using the time stamp counter on
AMD processor has coarser granularity, compared to Intel
processors4. Thus, the receiver needs to take multiple repeated
measurements and take the average to determine if it is an L1
hit or not, this lowers the bandwidth of the channel.
B. LRU Channel with Shared Memory
For power-savings, AMD L1 cache has a special linear
address utag and way-predictor (see 2.6.2.2 in [41]). The utag
is a hash of the linear address. For a load, while the physical
address is looked up in TLB, the L1 cache uses the hash of
the linear address to match the utag and determines which
cache way to use in the cache set. When the physical address
is available, only one cache way will be looked up instead of
all 8 ways. So, when the physical address of a load matches
a cache line in the cache, if the utag of that way is of a
different linear address, unless the hash of two linear addresses
conflicts, a latency of an L1 miss will be observed, even though
the physical address matches and data is in the L1 cache.
This makes our Algorithm 1 across processes using different
address spaces limited. If the sender process accesses line 0,
the utag of line 0 will be updated with the linear address of line
0 in the sender’s address space. When the receiver accesses
line 0 and measures the time, unless the hash of the linear
address of line 0 in the sender’s process and in the receiver’s
process conflicts, the receiver will always observe an L1 cache
miss latency no matter if the line 0 is in L1 or not. However,
the hash of utag is not designed for security and is possible
to be reverse-engineered.
4There is also Actual Performance Frequency Clock Count APERF in
AMD. But it is only accessible from Ring-0, which does not fit with our
threat model.
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Fig. 7: Example sequences of receiver’s observation when the sender
is sending 0 and 1 alternatively using (top) Algorithm 1 and (bottom)
Algorithm 2 on AMD EPYC 7571. For Algorithm 1, Tr = 1000,
Ts = 10
5, d = 8, and the transmission rate is 22Kbps. For Algorithm
2, Tr = 1000, Ts = 105, d = 4, and the transmission rate is 25Kbps.
The light blue dot line shows the moving average.
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Fig. 8: Percentage of 1’s observed by the receiver on AMD EPYC
7571, when the sender and receiver are sharing a core in a time-
slice setting and the sender is sending (left) 0 and (right) 1 using
Algorithm 1.
As long as the sender and the receiver are in the same
address space, the LRU channel using Algorithm 1 still exists.
For example, it can be used to transfer information in the
case of escaping sandbox in JavaScript [18], and it can be
built between program threads in the same address space.
Figure 7 (top) shows the trace observed by the receiver, when
the receiver and the sender are two threads in the same address
space (using pthreads in C) running in a hyper-threaded
sharing, with Tr = 1000 cycles, Ts = 105 cycles, and d = 8.
Due to the coarse granularity of the readout value of the
time stamp counter in AMD, it is hard to identify the signal
from the raw measurements (blue dots). The light blue dot
line in Figure 7 shows the moving average of the latency
of 97 measurements, where the 97 is the best fit period of
sending one bit for this trace5. When the sender is sending 0
5The fact that the period does not equal to Ts/Tr indicates that threads do
not get scheduled evenly. This might be due to the Amazon EC2 platform, as
we observe similar phenomenon on Intel processors on EC2.
and 1 alternatively, the moving average is a wave-like pattern,
meaning the receiver can receive the message from the sender.
By measuring the total time taken by the receiver to gather
the trace and the period of each bit received, the effective
transmission rate is 22Kbps. Due to the coarser-granularity of
the AMD time stamp counter and running at lower frequency,
the transmission rate of the channel is about one order of
magnitude lower than that in Intel processors.
We also tested Algorithm 1 under time-sliced sharing setting
using pthreads. Figure 8 shows the different results observed
by the receiver when the sender is sending 0 and 1. The
thresholds to decide whether a latency represents 0 and 1 are
selected such as to maximize the difference between 0 and 1.
As shown in Figure 8, when Tr = 108 cycles, the receiver
will receive about 70% of 1s when the sender is sending 0,
and about 77% of 1s when the sender is sending 1. This is
enough to differentiate 0 and 1, by examining if % of 1s is
below or above the threshold. Assuming 100 measurements
are needed to differentiate 77% from 70%, the transmission
rate is about 0.2 bits per second. When increasing Tr, more
interleaving between the sender thread and the receiver thread
happens during each measurement taken by the receiver, and
the difference between 0 and 1 gets greater indicating less
noise. The parameter d does not play a significant role here.
C. LRU Channel without Shared Memory
We also tested Algorithm 2 under hyper-threaded sharing on
AMD EPYC 7571. Figure 7 (bottom) shows a trace observed
by the receiver when the sender is sending 0 and 1 alternatively
with Tr = 1000, Ts = 105, and d = 4. The receiver and
the sender are two programs (in different memory space).
Similarly, the light blue dot line shows the moving average
of the latency of 85 measurements, where the 85 is the best
fit, resulting in an effective transmission rate of 25Kbps. When
the sender is sending 0 and 1 alternatively, the moving average
is a wave-like pattern, meaning the receiver can receive the
message from the sender. The measured latency in Figure 7
(top) and (bottom) are quite different. This might due to the
processor running at a different frequency for power saving
at the time of measurement. We do not observe any signal
using Algorithm 2 in time-sliced sharing, similar to the case
for Intel.
D. Comparing the Evaluated LRU Channels
Table IV compares the transmission rate of the channels
tested with different configurations. Hyper-threading gives a
much higher transmission rate than time-sliced sharing, be-
cause of more interference between the sender and the receiver.
Under hyper-threading, Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 have
similar transmission rate. However, recall that Algorithm 2 is
easily affected by noise due to activities of other programs,
but the noise is easy to filter, because the noise activity is
usually of a different frequency. The LRU channel on AMD
processors is about one order of magnitude slower than on
Intel processors, due to the coarser-granularity of readout value
of time stamp counter and lower clock frequency.
TABLE IV: Transmission rate of the evaluated LRU channels
Intel AMD
Hyper-Threaded Algorithm 1 ∼500Kbps ∼20KbpsAlgorithm 2 ∼500Kbps ∼20Kbps
Time-Sliced Algorithm 1 ∼2bps ∼0.2bpsAlgorithm 2 – –
VII. COMPARISON TO EXISTING CACHE COVERT
CHANNELS
In most of the existing cache side channels, the receiver
measures whether certain cache line exists in the cache di-
rectly. For example, in the Flush+Reload attack [1], the sender
fetches a cache line into the cache, and the receiver measures
directly whether a certain cache line is in the cache. To
build a channel, the cache replacement should happen due to
the sender’s access. Meanwhile, in our LRU cache channel,
the sender’s operations does not need to cause any cache
replacements, because the LRU states are updated on both
cache hits and misses. Instead, the cache replacement happens
when the receiver wants to measure the LRU state during
decoding.
Table V shows the encoding time of the sender. The encod-
ing times in the table include the time to calculate the victim
address. For LRU channels, it is assumed that the victim line
is already in cache before the attack. The LRU channels are
compared with the Flush+Reload channels. We implemented
two Flush+Reload channels, the one denoted by F+R (mem)
uses clflush instruction to flush the data all the way down
to memory, while the F+R (L1) uses eight accesses to the
L1 cache set to evict the data from L1. As is shown in the
table, both LRU channels require less encoding time than F+R
channels. Because for the LRU channel, the sender can encode
the message with cache hits, while the Flush+Reload channels
always require the sender to have cache misses in the target
cache level.
Table VI shows the cache miss rate of the sender process.
The results are measured using Linux Perf tool from hardware
performance counters6. The results show that the sender of
LRU Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 have smaller L1 cache
miss rate than the Flush+Reload. To provide a baseline of no
attack, we also show the results when there is only the sender
process running on the physical core (denoted by sender only)
and the results with the sender sharing the physical core with a
benign gcc workload (denoted by sender & gcc). When there
is only the sender process, it has the smallest L1 miss rate7.
When it is sharing the core with a benign program, the benign
program, e.g., the gcc, will cause contention in the cache,
similar or even bigger to the contention due to the receiver in
the LRU channel. Hence, if a victim wants to detect a potential
cache side channel attacks using performance counters [42]–
6We do not have access to the hardware performance counter on AMD
machines on Amazon AWS, so only result from local Intel machines are
shown in Table VII
7The sender only case still has relative high L2 and LLC miss rate due to
less references to the L2 and LLC.
TABLE V: Latency of Encoding (cycles)
F+R
(mem)
F+R
(L1)
L1 LRU
(Alg.1&2)
Intel Xeon
E5-2690
336 35 31
Intel Xeon
E3-1245 v5
288 40 35
AMD EPYC
7571
232 56 52
TABLE VI: Cache Miss Rate of the Sender Process
F+R
(mem)
F+R
(L1)
L1 LRU
Alg.1
L1 LRU
Alg.2
sender
& gcc
sender
only
Intel Xeon
E5-2690
L1D 0.07% 0.04% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.01%
L2 62% 6.67% 9.59% 15.6% 31% 8.32%
LLC 88% 0.77% 0.71% 1.07% 61% 1.46%
Intel Xeon
E3-1245 v5
L1D 0.06% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00%
L2 63% 11% 17% 14% 48% 26%
LLC 92% 8.12% 8.15% 7.42% 70% 27%
[44], the LRU channel is difficult to detect as it may not be
distinguished from the contention due to benign programs.
Comparing Algorithm 1 with Flush+Reload attack [1],
both need shared memory, but the LRU channel does not
require explicit flush, and line 0 might be always in the
cache. Comparing Algorithm 2 with Flush+Reload attack,
no shared memory is required. Comparing Algorithm 2 with
Prime+Probe attack [2], both do not require shared memory.
But in Algorithm 2, line N, which is the line accessed by the
sender depends on the secret, might be always in the cache.
Moreover, the receiver only needs to measure the time of one
memory access in LRU channel rather than N cache lines in
the Prime+Probe attack.
VIII. LRU CHANNELS IN TRANSIENT EXECUTION
ATTACKS
Transient execution attacks leverage transient execution to
access secret and a covert channel to pass the secret to the
attacker [18]–[20]. Currently, most transient execution attacks
proof-of-concept code uses the cache Flush+Reload covert
channel, e.g., the example code in [18]. Here we demonstrate
that our LRU covert channel also works with Spectre attack
to retrieve the secret.
Note that here the secret contains more than 1 bit and
multiple cache sets are used to encode the secret. In practice,
63 cache sets are used (both Intel and AMD processors tested
have 64 sets, remaining one set is for the 7 elements in the
pointer chasing algorithm as discussed in Section IV-D). Prac-
tical issues such as minimizing noise due to cache prefetchers
are discussed in the Appendix C.
The Flush+Reload covert channel needs one memory access
depending on the secret as the sender’s operation. Meanwhile,
as shown in both algorithms in Section IV, the sender’s
operation in the LRU channels also only need one memory
access whose target set depends on the secret. Thus, the victim
TABLE VII: Cache Miss Rate of Spectre V1 Attack
F+R
(mem)
F+R
(L1)
L1 LRU
Alg.1
L1 LRU
Alg.2
Intel Xeon
E5-2690
L1D 2.75% 4.73% 4.19% 4.75%
L2 7.58% 0.07% 0.11% 0.09%
LLC 98.15% 0.87% 0.72% 0.87%
Intel Xeon
E3-1245 v5
L1D 2.86% 4.84% 4.13% 4.86%
L2 7.39% 0.49% 0.71% 0.45%
LLC 91.17% 1.83% 0.74% 0.96%
code using the LRU channel can be identical to the disclosure
gadget in the Flush+Reload channel. Thus, when demonstrat-
ing transient execution attack using the LRU channels, we take
the in Spectre variant 1 attack sample code [18] and keep the
victim (sender) code to be the same, and change the attacker
(receiver) code to use the L1 LRU channels as the disclosure
primitive instead. We are able to launch the Spectre attack
using the LRU channels (both Algorithm 1 and 2) to observe
the secret. Table VII shows the cache miss rate (including both
the victim and the attacker) during a Spectre attack.
Comparing to the Flush+Reload channel, the advantage of
the LRU disclosure primitive is the short encoding time (i.e.,
the sender’s operations), and thus, a smaller speculative win-
dow is required, which may make the attack more dangerous
and harder to defend.
IX. DEFENDING THE LRU CHANNELS
The LRU timing-based channels leverage the fact that the
sender and the receiver share the LRU states in caches. Thus,
there could be several approaches to defend the LRU timing-
based channels.
A. Removing the LRU States
One approach is to use another cache replacement policy
instead of LRU or PLRU. In this way, no more LRU state
exists, and the channel is removed.
Random Replacement Policy: Random replacement policy
does not need any states in the cache. Every time a replacement
is needed, a random cache way in the cache set will be evicted.
FIFO Replacement Policy: First-In First-Out (FIFO or
Round-Robin) replacement policy selects the oldest cache line
that is fetched into the cache to be the victim. States are
still required to store the history of cache lines fetched into
cache. However, different from LRU, the FIFO states are only
updated when a new cache line is brought into the cache on
cache misses. And thus, although FIFO state contains extra
information than which cache line is presented in the cache,
the sender’s behavior might already be able to be observed by
the receiver using existing cache channels.
Performance Evaluation of Random and FIFO Poli-
cies: LRU replacement policy is widely used in processors
because of its performance. In this section, we evaluate the
performance of different replacement policies in the GEM5
simulator [45]. We simulated a single out-of-order CPU core
and a memory system with 2-level caches (32KiB 4-way L1I,
64KiB 8-way L1D with a latency of 4 cycles, 2MiB 16-way
Fig. 9: (top) Cache miss rate of L1 Data cache and (bottom) normalized CPI when different cache replacement policies (Tree-PLRU, FIFO,
random) are used in the L1 Data cache. The results are normalized with the result of Tree-PLRU policy.
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Fig. 10: PL cache replacement logic flow-chart. White boxes show
the original PL cache design in [24]. Blue boxes show the new PL
logic added in our simulation to defend the LRU attack.
L2 with a latency of 8 cycles, and main memory latency of
50ns). SPEC 2006 int and float benchmarks were tested [46].
Since we focus on the LRU channels in the L1D cache, we
tested different replacement policies in L1D cache.
As shown in Figure 9 (top), compared to Tree-PLRU, the
FIFO and Random replacement policies give small degradation
on L1D cache miss rate overall. Depending on the benchmark,
FIFO and Random replacement policy sometimes have an even
smaller cache miss rate than Tree-PLRU. Since an L1 miss
can still hit in L2, the overall CPU performance, indicated
by cycles per instruction (CPI) in Figure 9 (bottom), is only
changed less than 2% compared to the baseline. Thus, using
a different replacement policy in the L1 cache to mitigate the
LRU side and covert channel only gives small overhead –
while increasing security. Similarly, if the channels in all the
levels of cache are to be mitigated, the replacement policies
of all the levels of caches needs to be changed.
B. LRU Attack and Secure Caches
Partitioning: Many secure caches partition the cache lines
(tag and data) between the victim and the attacker [23]–[26],
[47], but the replacement policy and state is not considered
and specified.
Fig. 11: Simulation result of the LRU attack Algorithm 2 in GEM5
with (top) original PL cache design and (bottom) new PL cache
design which locks the LRU state to defend the LRU attack.
For example, in Partition-Locked (PL) cache [24], each
cache line is extended with one lock bit. When a cache line is
locked, the line will not be evicted by any cache replacement
until unlocking to protect the line, as shown in Figure 10.
If a locked line is chosen as victim to be replaced, the
replacement will not happen and the incoming line will be
handled uncached. But the LRU state will still be updated on
accesses to the locked cache line, and the update will affect
the LRU states of other lines. We implemented the PL cache
using PLRU replacement algorithm in the GEM5 simulator,
and tested the LRU attack. During the test, line N (the line
accessed by the sender) is first locked by the sender, and
Algorithm 28 is used to build a channel. As shown in Figure 11
(top), with the original design, the receiver can still receive the
secret by observe the timing of accessing line 0. To mitigate
the LRU channel, the LRU state should be locked as well. We
add the blue boxes in Figure 10 to PL cache design. With the
new design, receiver will always observe a cache hit, as shown
in Figure 11 (bottom).
In DAWG [28], it is proposed to partition the cache ways
and the Tree-PLRU states in a cache set between protection
8Algorithm 1 is protected by PL cache when line 0 is locked. Because line
0 will not be evicted in the decoding phase, and the receiver will always get
cache hit no matter what the sender is sending.
domains. We are unaware of any other designs that partition
the LRU states.
For transient execution cache side-channel attacks, one
solution proposed in Invisispec [32] is to only update micro-
architectural states (including the LRU state) after the access
is not speculative.
There are also software partitioning schemes. For example,
using “page coloring” to map different processes to different
cache sets to partition the cache [47]. However, the L1 cache
is small and partitioning of the L1 cache cannot be achieved
by partitioning the addresses at the granularity of a page.
Randomization: Other secure cache designs mitigate cache
channels by adding randomness in the logic. For example,
Random fill cache [29] decouple the access and the cache line
brought into cache, by fetching a random cache line into cache
instead of the cache line being accessed. However, if the cache
line is already in the cache, on a cache hit, the replacement
state will be updated, and the LRU channel could still work.
Some secure cache designs randomize the mapping between
the addresses and the cache sets, such as New cache, RP
cache, CEASER cache [24], [30], [48]. So the receiver (and
the sender) cannot map the addresses to the target cache set
to build a channel.
X. RELATED WORK
Most cache timing channels leverage the tag array. The
Flush+Reload attack [1] transfers information by reusing the
same data in the cache. There are other reuse-based cache
side-channel attacks, such as Cache Collision attack [3]. The
Prime+Probe attack [2], on the other hand, transfers informa-
tion by creating contention in the cache. Another example of
the contention-based side channel is Evict+Time attack [2].
Shared cache components other than the tag array have also
be leveraged for side and covert channels. For example, the
contention in the cache directory in non-inclusive caches has
been demonstrated and used for a side-channel attack [5].
Cache coherence states have also been used to create covert
channels [6], [49].
In parallel to this work, there is a recent arXiv preprint
paper [39] on side channels that leverage the replacement
policy in LLC, where shared memory is required. However, we
demonstrate the LRU channels both with and without shared
memory. Their attack also relies on clflush instruction and
their use of flush operation cannot be replaced by a series of
memory accesses (as we do in our attack), which makes the
attack unpractical in settings where clflush is not available,
e.g., in JavaScript. Further, L1 is directly accessed by the
processor pipeline and local cache accesses will not cause
updates in the LLC replacement states used in [39], so our
attack is more stealthy and any LLC defenses do not stop the
L1 LRU channel.
Due to the threat of the various timing channels, many
secure cache designs have been proposed in the literature to
defend the attacks [23]–[28], [47], as already discussed in
Section IX-B. However, most do not have, or did not consider,
LRU attacks and cannot defend against them.
Another approach is to use hardware performance coun-
ters to detect a potential cache side channel attacks in real
time, [42]–[44], because the root cause of the existing cache
side channel is cache misses. However, the LRU channels
require either hits or misses, so counting misses of the sender
only will not detect the attack.
XI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented novel timing-based channels
leveraging the cache LRU replacement states. We designed
two protocols to transfer information between processes using
the LRU states for both cases when there is shared memory
between the sender and the receiver and when there is no
shared memory. We also demonstrated the LRU channels on
real-world commercial processors. The LRU channels require
access (cache hit or miss) from the sender, while all the
existing known timing-based cache side and covert channels
always need the sender to trigger a cache replacement (a
cache miss). Thus, the LRU channel has shorter encoding time,
lower cache miss rate for the sender, and requires a smaller
speculation window in transient attack scenarios. We show the
new LRU channel also affect the current secure cache designs.
In the end, we proposed several methods to mitigate the LRU
channel and evaluated them, including modified design of a
secure PL cache.
Responsible Disclosure: We have informed Intel and AMD of
our findings on March 6th, 2019, and they have acknowledged
the receipt of the information.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
We would like to thank the authors of Invisispec [32],
especially Mengjia Yan, for the their open-source code and
scripts. Special thanks to Linbo Shao for helping with PL
cache implementation in GEM5. Thanks to Amazon for their
cloud research credits that we used to run some of our
experiments and benchmarks on their EC2 platform. This work
was supported by NSF grants 1651945 and 1813797, and
through SRC award number 2844.001.
REFERENCES
[1] Y. Yarom and K. Falkner, “Flush+ reload: A high resolution, low noise,
l3 cache side-channel attack.” in USENIX Security Symposium, vol. 1,
2014.
[2] D. A. Osvik, A. Shamir, and E. Tromer, “Cache attacks and countermea-
sures: the case of AES,” in Cryptographers Track at the RSA Conference.
Springer, 2006.
[3] J. Bonneau and I. Mironov, “Cache-collision timing attacks against
AES,” in International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and
Embedded Systems. Springer, 2006.
[4] F. Liu, Y. Yarom, Q. Ge, G. Heiser, and R. B. Lee, “Last-level cache
side-channel attacks are practical,” in Security and Privacy (SP), 2015
IEEE Symposium on. IEEE, 2015.
[5] M. Yan, R. Sprabery, B. Gopireddy, C. Fletcher, R. Campbell, and
J. Torrellas, “Attack directories, not caches: Side channel attacks in a
non-inclusive world,” in Attack Directories, Not Caches: Side Channel
Attacks in a Non-Inclusive World. IEEE, 2019.
[6] F. Yao, M. Doroslovacki, and G. Venkataramani, “Are Coherence Pro-
tocol States Vulnerable to Information Leakage?” in High Performance
Computer Architecture (HPCA), 2018 IEEE International Symposium
on. IEEE, 2018.
[7] Z. Wang and R. B. Lee, “Covert and side channels due to processor
architecture,” in Computer Security Applications Conference, 2006.
ACSAC’06. 22nd Annual. IEEE, 2006.
[8] M. Schwarz, M. Schwarzl, M. Lipp, and D. Gruss, “Netspectre: Read
arbitrary memory over network,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.10535,
2018.
[9] A. Moghimi, T. Eisenbarth, and B. Sunar, “Memjam: A false depen-
dency attack against constant-time crypto implementations in sgx,” in
Cryptographers Track at the RSA Conference. Springer, 2018.
[10] A. C. Aldaya, B. B. Brumley, S. ul Hassan, C. P. Garcı´a, and N. Tuveri,
“Port contention for fun and profit,” in Port Contention for Fun and
Profit.
[11] A. Bhattacharyya, A. Sandulescu, M. Neugschwandtner, A. Sorniotti,
B. Falsafi, M. Payer, and A. Kurmus, “Smotherspectre: exploit-
ing speculative execution through port contention,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1903.01843, 2019.
[12] D. Evtyushkin, R. Riley, N. C. Abu-Ghazaleh, D. Ponomarev et al.,
“Branchscope: A new side-channel attack on directional branch predic-
tor,” in ACM SIGPLAN Notices, vol. 53, no. 2. ACM, 2018.
[13] D. Evtyushkin, D. Ponomarev, and N. Abu-Ghazaleh, “Jump over
aslr: Attacking branch predictors to bypass aslr,” in The 49th Annual
IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture. IEEE Press,
2016.
[14] D. Gullasch, E. Bangerter, and S. Krenn, “Cache games–Bringing
access-based cache attacks on AES to practice,” in Security and Privacy
(SP), 2011 IEEE Symposium on. IEEE, 2011.
[15] C. Percival, “Cache missing for fun and profit,” 2005.
[16] D. J. Bernstein, “Cache-timing attacks on AES,” 2005.
[17] O. Acıic¸mez and C¸. K. Koc¸, “Trace-driven cache attacks on AES (short
paper),” in International Conference on Information and Communica-
tions Security. Springer, 2006.
[18] P. Kocher, J. Horn, A. Fogh, , D. Genkin, D. Gruss, W. Haas,
M. Hamburg, M. Lipp, S. Mangard, T. Prescher, M. Schwarz, and
Y. Yarom, “Spectre attacks: Exploiting speculative execution,” in 40th
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P’19), 2019.
[19] M. Lipp, M. Schwarz, D. Gruss, T. Prescher, W. Haas, A. Fogh,
J. Horn, S. Mangard, P. Kocher, D. Genkin, Y. Yarom, and M. Hamburg,
“Meltdown: Reading kernel memory from user space,” in 27th USENIX
Security Symposium (USENIX Security 18), 2018.
[20] C. Canella, J. Van Bulck, M. Schwarz, M. Lipp, B. von Berg, P. Ortner,
F. Piessens, D. Evtyushkin, and D. Gruss, “A Systematic Evalua-
tion of Transient Execution Attacks and Defenses,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1811.05441, 2018.
[21] K. So and R. N. Rechtschaffen, “Cache operations by mru change,”
IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. 37, 1988.
[22] A. Malamy, R. N. Patel, and N. M. Hayes, “Methods and apparatus for
implementing a pseudo-lru cache memory replacement scheme with a
locking feature,” Oct. 4 1994, uS Patent 5,353,425.
[23] R. B. Lee, P. Kwan, J. P. McGregor, J. Dwoskin, and Z. Wang,
“Architecture for protecting critical secrets in microprocessors,” in ACM
SIGARCH Computer Architecture News, vol. 33, no. 2. IEEE Computer
Society, 2005.
[24] Z. Wang and R. B. Lee, “New cache designs for thwarting software
cache-based side channel attacks,” in ACM SIGARCH Computer Archi-
tecture News, vol. 35, no. 2. ACM, 2007.
[25] L. Domnitser, A. Jaleel, J. Loew, N. Abu-Ghazaleh, and D. Ponomarev,
“Non-monopolizable caches: Low-complexity mitigation of cache side
channel attacks,” ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Opti-
mization (TACO), vol. 8, 2012.
[26] D. Zhang, A. Askarov, and A. C. Myers, “Language-based control and
mitigation of timing channels,” ACM SIGPLAN Notices, vol. 47, 2012.
[27] M. Yan, B. Gopireddy, T. Shull, and J. Torrellas, “Secure Hierarchy-
Aware Cache Replacement Policy (SHARP): Defending Against Cache-
Based Side Channel Attacks,” in Proceedings of the 44th Annual
International Symposium on Computer Architecture. ACM, 2017.
[28] V. Kiriansky, I. Lebedev, S. Amarasinghe, S. Devadas, and J. Emer,
“DAWG: A defense against cache timing attacks in speculative execution
processors,” in 2018 51st Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium
on Microarchitecture (MICRO). IEEE, 2018.
[29] F. Liu and R. B. Lee, “Random fill cache architecture,” in Microarchitec-
ture (MICRO), 2014 47th Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium
on. IEEE, 2014.
[30] F. Liu, H. Wu, K. Mai, and R. B. Lee, “Newcache: Secure cache
architecture thwarting cache side-channel attacks,” IEEE Micro, vol. 36,
2016.
[31] G. Keramidas, A. Antonopoulos, D. N. Serpanos, and S. Kaxiras, “Non
deterministic caches: A simple and effective defense against side channel
attacks,” Design Automation for Embedded Systems, vol. 12, 2008.
[32] M. Yan, J. Choi, D. Skarlatos, A. Morrison, C. Fletcher, and J. Torrel-
las, “InvisiSpec: Making Speculative Execution Invisible in the Cache
Hierarchy,” in 2018 51st Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium
on Microarchitecture (MICRO). IEEE, 2018.
[33] K. N. Khasawneh, E. M. Koruyeh, C. Song, D. Evtyushkin,
D. Ponomarev, and N. Abu-Ghazaleh, “Safespec: Banishing the spec-
tre of a meltdown with leakage-free speculation,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1806.05179, 2018.
[34] A. Jaleel, K. B. Theobald, S. C. Steely Jr, and J. Emer, “High perfor-
mance cache replacement using re-reference interval prediction (rrip),”
in ACM SIGARCH Computer Architecture News, vol. 38, no. 3. ACM,
2010.
[35] T. Ristenpart, E. Tromer, H. Shacham, and S. Savage, “Hey, you, get
off of my cloud: exploring information leakage in third-party compute
clouds,” in Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and
communications security. ACM, 2009.
[36] Y. Zhang, A. Juels, M. K. Reiter, and T. Ristenpart, “Cross-tenant
side-channel attacks in PaaS clouds,” in Proceedings of the 2014 ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM,
2014.
[37] E. M. Koruyeh, K. N. Khasawneh, C. Song, and N. Abu-Ghazaleh,
“Spectre returns! speculation attacks using the return stack buffer,” in
12th USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies (WOOT 18), 2018.
[38] G. Maisuradze and C. Rossow, “ret2spec: Speculative execution using
return stack buffers,” in Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Confer-
ence on Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 2018.
[39] S. Briongos, P. Malago´n, J. M. Moya, and T. Eisenbarth, “Reload+
refresh: Abusing cache replacement policies to perform stealthy cache
attacks,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1904.06278, 2019.
[40] G. Navarro, “A guided tour to approximate string matching,” ACM
computing surveys (CSUR), vol. 33, 2001.
[41] Software Optimization Guide for AMD Family 17h Processors,
https://developer.amd.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/55723 SOG
Fam 17h Processors 3.00.pdf accessed Feb. 2019.
[42] T. Zhang, Y. Zhang, and R. B. Lee, “Cloudradar: A real-time side-
channel attack detection system in clouds,” in International Symposium
on Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses. Springer, 2016.
[43] M. Chiappetta, E. Savas, and C. Yilmaz, “Real time detection of
cache-based side-channel attacks using hardware performance counters,”
Applied Soft Computing, vol. 49, 2016.
[44] M. Alam, S. Bhattacharya, D. Mukhopadhyay, and S. Bhattacharya,
“Performance counters to rescue: A machine learning based safe-
guard against micro-architectural side-channel-attacks.” IACR Cryptol-
ogy ePrint Archive, vol. 2017, 2017.
[45] N. Binkert, B. Beckmann, G. Black, S. K. Reinhardt, A. Saidi, A. Basu,
J. Hestness, D. R. Hower, T. Krishna, S. Sardashti et al., “The GEM5
simulator,” ACM SIGARCH Computer Architecture News, vol. 39, 2011.
[46] J. L. Henning, “Spec cpu2006 benchmark descriptions,” ACM SIGARCH
Computer Architecture News, vol. 34, 2006.
[47] V. Costan, I. Lebedev, and S. Devadas, “Sanctum: Minimal hardware
extensions for strong software isolation,” in 25th USENIX Security
Symposium (USENIX Security 16), 2016.
[48] M. K. Qureshi, “Ceaser: Mitigating conflict-based cache attacks via
encrypted-address and remapping,” in 2018 51st Annual IEEE/ACM
International Symposium on Microarchitecture (MICRO). IEEE, 2018.
[49] C. Trippel, D. Lustig, and M. Martonosi, “MeltdownPrime and Spec-
trePrime: Automatically-Synthesized Attacks Exploiting Invalidation-
Based Coherence Protocols,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.03802, 2018.
APPENDIX A
MEASURING TIME WITH rdtscp
Figure 12 shows the code to measure the time of a single
memory access using rdtscp instruction. Figure 13 shows the
measurement results using the code in Figure 12 when the
data is in difference cache levels. As shown in Figure 13,
the measurement results of L1 hit and L1 miss (L2 hit)
completely overlap and have the same distribution. Thus,
simply measuring a single memory access cannot distinguish
the time different between L1 hit and L1 miss. Replacing the
rdtscp instruction with the lfence and rdtsc instructions has the
same result. Hence, we use pointer chasing approach discussed
in the paper.
r d t s c p
movl %eax , %e s i
movq (% rbx ) , %r a x <− memory a c c e s s b e i n g measured
r d t s c p
s u b l %e s i , %eax
Fig. 12: Code to measure the latency of a single access.
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Fig. 13: Histogram of access latencies of single L1 hit and L1 miss
(L2 hit) measured by rdtscp (left) on Intel Xeon E5-2690 and (right)
on AMD EPYC 7571.
APPENDIX B
RESULTS ON INTEL XEON E3-1245 V5
Figure 14 shows the traces observed by the receiver in
hyper-threaded sharing on Intel Xeon E3-1245 v5 using Al-
gorithm 1 (top) and Algorithm 2 (bottom). The experimental
setting is the same as in Figure 5. Figure 15 shows the
percentage of 1’s observed by the receiver using Algorithm
1 in time-sliced sharing with the same setting as in Figure 6.
The results are similar to that on Intel Xeon E5-2690 and show
the attack can be applied to multiple platforms.
APPENDIX C
DEALING WITH NOISE FROM CACHE PREFETCHERS
During the Spectre attacks, a series of memory access
will be triggered, and the cache prefetchers would also be
activated and can prefetch cache lines into L1 cache, which
changes the LRU states. This introduces much added noise.
To deal with the noise from the prefetchers, our strategy is
to launch the attack in multiple rounds. For each round, the
cache sets are accessed in a different random order (using
a random number generator, with a different seed for each
round). When processing the result, the average of all the
rounds is taken. Because each round uses a different random
seed, the prefetcher will prefetch different cache lines in each
round, and the noise should be cancelled out.
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Fig. 14: Example sequences of receiver’s observation when the
sender is sending 0 and 1 alternatively using (top) Algorithm 1 with
Tr = 600, Ts = 6000, and d = 8 and (bottom) Algorithm 2 with
Tr = 600, Ts = 6000 and d = 4 on Intel Xeon E3-1245 v5 with a
transmission rate of 580Kbps.
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Fig. 15: Percentage of 1’s observed by the receiver on Intel Xeon
E3-1245 v5, when the sender is sending (left) 0 and (right) 1 using
Algorithm 1 under time-sliced sharing.
